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Political and Institutional Determinants of the Cyclicality of 
Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the OECD and Latin America1
Introduction
In recent years, researchers have been paying greater attention to the behaviour 
of fiscal policy over the business cycle. According to the Keynesian wisdom, fiscal 
policy should behave in a countercyclical fashion, with public expenditure acting in 
such a way as to stabilize the business cycle. Another well-known theoretical statement 
related to fiscal cyclicality is the “tax-smoothing” hypothesis, according to which tax 
rates should be held constant over the business cycle for a given path of public 
expenditure. So, budget surplus should behave procyclically (Barro, 1979). On the 
expenditure side, the neoclassical literature is relatively weak in offering normative 
conclusions, since the typical assumption is that public expenses are exogenously 
determined (Lucas and Stokey, 1983; Blanchard and Fisher, 1989).
In the context of EMU, for example, fiscal policy plays a crucial role of cyclical 
stabilization in the presence of asymmetric shocks, since it is the last macroeconomic 
policy under the control of national governments. Given this statement, and also bearing
in mind the normative approaches of the previous paragraph, procyclicality is 
something that should be avoided. However, some important evidence of procyclicality 
has been found, particularly in some studies covering Latin-American countries (Talvi 
and Végh, 2005; Stein et al., 1999; Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Gavin et al., 1996).
The aim of this paper is to investigate the influence of political and institutional 
variables on the cyclicality of fiscal policy, in a group of 38 selected OECD and Latin 
American countries, between 1960 and 2003. Our fiscal variables are real central 
government total expenditure and revenue. In order to explain the cyclical pattern of 
these fiscal variables, we use a large set of determinants including aspects such as socio-
political instability, the age and quality of democracies and institutions, electoral rules 
and forms of government, social polarization or the role of the IMF stabilization 
programmes.
In relation to most of the literature concerning the cyclicalityof fiscal policy, we 
widen both the geographical coverage (by considering both the  OECD and Latin 
America instead of either one or the other) and budget categories (not only government 
expenditure but also revenue)
1. Additional contributions are introduced into this present 
work. First and foremost, we use a much wider set of variables than the related 
literature, in order to explain fiscal cyclicality. Some of them were also used in other 
papers, though applied to different dimensions of fiscal policy. For example, our 
measures of socio-political instability, such as the number of government crises or the 
number of cabinet changes, were used by Woo (2003) as possible determinants of a 
deficit bias. We will try to discover if those variables also help to explain fiscal 
cyclicality. We also propose new variables – for instance, to check the role of the IMF 
stabilization programmes as a possible determinant of cross-country differences in the 
cyclical pattern of fiscal policy. Additionally, we have addressed in some detail 
methodological issues that are often neglected in the literature, such as dealing 
   
1 A few previous studies, such as Woo (2005), Persson and Tabellini (2003), and Alesina and Tabellini 
(2005), also use samples of both OECD and Latin American countries. In addition, Alesina and Tabellini 
(2005) define the cyclicality of fiscal policy in terms of government expenditure, revenue, and the overall 
budget deficit.2
systematically with outliers, and ensuring coherence between the time span of the 
several variables involved (fiscal and political/institutional). 
In the following section, the related literature will be reviewed. Section 3 
presents the data used in our empirical work. In Section 4, we present the empirical 
strategy. Section 5 contains the main empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
2 - Related Literature 
In the last decade, an important part of the literature associated with fiscal policy 
has been addressing the issue of cyclicality. We are able to find both theoretical and 
empirical developments in this field of research.
One possible explanation for procyclical fiscal policies is given by Gavin and 
Perotti (1997). They argue that procyclicality, which is more commonly found in Latin 
American countries, may have to do with the loss of access to external financing during 
bad times. Hence, countries are unable to borrow in bad times, which require a 
contractionary fiscal policy.
Talvi and Végh (2005), however, argue that procyclicality in developing 
countries has much more to do with the variability of the tax base in these countries 
(between two and four times higher than in G-7 countries). The authors develop an 
optimal fiscal policy model, including a political distortion according to which there
exists an endogenous component of government spending that depends positively on the 
budget surplus. A government facing strong fluctuations in the tax base will be forced to 
accept an increase in expenditure in good times, since political pressures become harder 
to resist. Given this political distortion, the best way to avoid a high growth in
expenditure is to lower tax rates. This procyclical behaviour is a second-best response to 
that political distortion. This explanation contrasts with the one given by Gavin and 
Perotti (1997). In addition,  the  authors  refer to the contribution of Lane (2003), 
according to which procyclicality is also present in many OECD countries, for which 
the lack of access to international credit markets has not been typically an issue. 
Alesina and Tabellini (2005) explain the outcome of procyclicality in democratic 
developing countries through the argument that voters face corrupt governments that 
can appropriate part of tax revenues for unproductive public consumption (political 
rents). In good times, voters expect governments to increase political rents, thus 
pressing politicians to increase social spending (or cut taxes) in order to obtain part of 
those rents. The closer the electoral period, the better the results will be for voters. In 
addition, the authors criticize the argument related to the supply of credit (borrowing
constraints) used by Gavin and Perotti (1997) and Kaminski et al. (2004), among others.
Tornell and Lane (1999) and Lane and Tornell (1998) give an alternative 
political explanation for the question  as to why many countries follow seemingly 
procyclical fiscal policies. According to these authors, when more resources are 
available, the common pool problem is more severe and the fight over common 
resources intensifies, leading to budget deficits. This is what they call the “voracity 
effect”. 3
Woo (2005) emphasizes the role of social polarization in understanding 
procyclical fiscal stances often observed in a number of countries. When there is
polarization of social preferences over public choices, the incentives become greater for 
policymakers to implement their preferred policies. This individual rationality may 
threaten efficiency for the economy. According to the author, such incentives may 
become particularly strong during boom periods, since increased revenues or new 
resources make their preferred policies seem easier to implement, thus producing 
procyclical fiscal policies.
At the same time, some relevant empirical findings have been emerging. Gavin 
et al. (1996) argue that fiscal outcomes are highly procyclical in Latin America and that 
this pattern is at its most pronounced during recessions. One important suggestion is 
that Latin American fiscal surpluses fail to move in a stabilizing manner due to the 
strong procyclical response of public spending. According to their estimations, a one 
percent increase in real GDP growth raises real spending of the consolidated central 
government by about 0.61 percent. Gavin and Perotti (1997) draw attention to the 
procyclical fiscal policy in Latin America, particularly in periods of low growth. In
contrast, in the industrialized economies, policy behaves countercyclically. Mailhos and 
Sosa (2000) show that fiscal policy in Uruguay was strongly procyclical during the 
period 1955-1998,  as far as both government spending and revenue are concerned. 
Gupta et al. (2004) found econometric evidence of procyclicality in the government 
expenditure of developing countries, though the degree of procyclicality varies across 
spending categories. Kaminski et al. (2004) found that fiscal policy is procyclical for the 
majority of developing countries. Alesina and Tabellini (2005) find that fiscal policy is 
procyclical in many developing countries and that this behaviour is mainly due to 
government spending. Their political argument, according to which voters in such 
countries face corrupt governments, is reinforced by the strong positive correlation 
between procyclicalityand measures of corruption.
Hallerberg and Strauch (2002) try to investigate to what extent fiscal policy has 
been playing its stabilizing role, as would be desirable in an EMU context. For this 
purpose, they estimate the cyclicality of various categories of both government 
expenditure and revenue. In a subsequent part of their work, the authors extend the 
model by including political and institutional factors in order to investigate the 
interaction of these variables with fiscal cyclicality. Their results suggest that political 
variables exhibit little influence on the cyclical pattern of public finances. Furthermore, 
the authors find a significant effect of the electoral cycle upon central government 
budgets. Lane (2003) also addresses the issue of cyclicality in a sample of OECD 
countries and for a large set of fiscal variables. The main conclusion is that output 
volatility and the  dispersion of political power are important determinants of fiscal 
procyclicality. Pina (2004) found a procyclical behaviour of public expenditure in 
Portugal. Public revenue, on the contrary, has reacted to the cycle in a stabilizing way, 
even when the influence of automatic stabilizers is removed.
Based on a sample of 56 countries, Talvi and Végh (2005) find that while fiscal 
policy in G-7 countries seems to be consistent with Barro’s tax-smoothing hypothesis, 
in developing countries spending and taxes are highly procyclical. Based on annual 
information for 96 countries over the period 1960-2001, Woo (2005) found that social 
polarization, measured by income or educational inequality, is consistently positively 
associated with procyclicality in fiscal policy.4
Different methodological strategies were followed in these empirical works. For 
example, Lane (2003), Alesina and Tabellini (2005) and Woo (2005) run a two-step 
estimation strategy, firstly in order to obtain cyclicality coefficients through time-series 
estimations, and secondly to find the determinants of those cyclical patterns by 
estimating cross-section regressions. On the other hand, Hallerberg and Strauch (2002) 
and Persson and Tabellini (2003) use panel data estimations in order to discover
significant determinants of cyclicality. As explained in Section 4, we follow the former 
approach in this paper.
3 – Data 
Our sample includes 38 countries, selected on the basis of size (at least one 
million inhabitants in 2003) and data availability (at least 14 observations to estimate 
the coefficients of cyclicality). Our time span ranges from 1960 to 2003 (the maximum 
sample length in our sources), though, for some countries, the data interval is shorter.
The main data sources are the International Financial Statistics (IFS), from the 
IMF, and World Development Indicators (WDI), from the World Bank. Our economic 
control variables, such as inflation (INFLATION), GDP per capita (GDPPC), openness
to trade (TRADE), and the percentage of the total population over 65 (POP65), are 
obtained from WDI. However, fiscal variables (central government expenditure and 
revenue) are obtained from IMF-IFS. We use fiscal data relative to central government 
instead of general government. A natural question is why. The first reason is data 
availability. Data on general government are available in the Government Finance 
Statistics (GFS) database of the IMF, but only from the 1970s onwards and for a small 
set of countries in our sample. The second important reason is data comparability. Since 
our sample includes OECD and Latin American countries, we tried to obtain, 
simultaneously, a large time span of data coverage and comparable data found in the 
IFS-IMF database. Nevertheless, using only central government deficit data could bring 
problems since a significant part of public expenditure and revenue in some developing 
countries is attributable to local and regional governments, as in the emblematic cases of 
Brazil and Argentina
2. Another important argument sustaining our option is given by 
Persson and Tabellini (2003), p. 38, where it is argued that in GFS, and for countries 
where data on general government are available, the correlation coefficient between the 
size of central government and the size of general government is about 0.9.
As already stated, a large set of political and institutional regressors
3 is 
considered in order to explain cross-country differences in the cyclical patterns of 
government expenditure and revenue. Some were used in previous studies on cyclicality 
(Section 2), others in studies on other dimensions of fiscal policy, whilst yet others are 
‘new’
4. These variables were grouped under the following categories (the data appendix 
provides more detailed information on each variable):
   
2 See Woo (2003), p. 390. However, at least these two countries are not included in our sample.
3 An appendix to the paper containing summary statistics on these regressors is available from the author 
upon request.
4 To some extent, our approach resembles that of Persson and Tabellini (2003), who claim that ‘We are 
not led by sharp theoretical priors but seek to describe systematic patterns in the data’ (Persson and 
Tabellini (2003), p. 236).5
3.1 – Socio-political instability
Such variables are considered in order to capture the existing socio-political 
instability, such as the number of cabinet changes (CABCHG), the number of major 
constitutional changes (CONSTCHG), the number of changes in the effective executive 
(EXECHG), the number of coups d’état (COUPS), government crises (GOVTCRIS), 
and revolutions (REVOLS). These variables were all used by Woo (2003) as possible 
determinants of a deficit bias. Changes in government were also used by Hallerberg and 
Strauch (2002), but from a different source.
3.2 – Quality and age of democracy
The quality and age of democracies is considered through the inclusion of three 
variables: an index of civil liberties and political rights, measuring the quality of 
democratic institutions, and produced by Freedom House (GASTIL); a score for 
democracy, measuring the degree of democratization in a country (POLITY); and an 
index of democracy age (AGE). Persson and Tabellini (2003) find a significant 
interaction between GASTIL and the dummies characterizing forms of government and 
electoral rules; the effects of a presidential regime and majoritarian elections on welfare 
state spending are also greater in better and older democracies. We seek to discover 
whether this set of determinants can help to explain the cyclicality of government 
expenditure and revenue.
3.3 – Quality of institutions
We use the variable POLCONIII
5, from Henisz (2002), in order to account for 
the effects of fiscal constraints. In a certain way, this variable is a proxy for the quality 
of institutions. Persson et al. (1997) conclude that an improvement in equilibrium 
outcomes (through the reduction of politicians’ rents) can result from a separation of 
powers with appropriate checks and balances. Thus, a greater dispersion of power (in 
the sense of checks and balances) may lead to sounder fiscal policy by reducing the 
harmful effects of polarization on fiscal behaviour. The index is also used by Woo 
(2005), in this case with higher values of the index (i.e. a greater separation of powers) 
leading to more countercyclical government spending. POLCONIII (the index used in 
the present work) is a more recent version of POLCON - see Henisz (2000). Lane 
(2003) uses POLCON as a proxy for the dispersion of political power, but his 
interpretation of the index is the opposite of the one given by Woo (2005), since Lane 
(2003) uses it as a proxy for the intensity of the voracity effect (see Section 2).
   
5 This (0,1) index is based on the number of veto points in the political systems and the distribution of 
preferences across and within the different institutions of political power. The greater the number of veto 
points and the division of control between different political parties, the greater the dispersion of power. 
Henisz (2000) shows that the index of political constraints is positively associated with economic growth. 
A greater dispersion of power reduces the ability of the executive branch to introduce legal or 
constitutional changes.6
3.4 – Electoral rules
A different class of variables included in our work is the one relating to the rules 
under which members of parliament and the executive are elected in a representative 
democracy. So, we have a variable MAJ equal to 1 if the lower house in a country is 
elected under the system of first-past-the-post or plurality rule. In fact, there are several 
authors  who maintain that electoral rules significantly affect fiscal outcomes
6. 
Following Persson and Tabellini (2003), we also include interaction variables to test 
whether the effects of majoritarian elections on the parameters of cyclicality depend on 
the age and quality of democracies. 
3.5 – Forms of government
Another very important dimension of the electoral systems has to do with the 
way in which the executive is chosen. We created a variable PRES as a dummy variable 
for the forms of government, which takes the value 1 if a country has a presidential 
regime. Several authors use these variables in empirical works on deficit bias and other 
dimensions of fiscal policy that are different from cyclicality
7. Again following Persson 
and Tabellini (2003), we control for the interactions of AGE and GASTIL with the 
different forms of government in relation to fiscal cyclicality
8. We also compute the 
product between MAJ and PRES (MAJPRES) in order to check the global effect on the 
cyclicalityof fiscal policy of a simultaneous shift to a presidential/majoritarian system. 
3.6 – Income inequality and social polarization
According to the existing literature, social polarization, measured by income 
and/or educational inequality, is an important source of social conflict that may lead to 
populist fiscal policy
9 10. Although some studies analyse the role of social polarization 
in the evolution of fiscal deficits
11 and the composition of government expenditures, 
   
6 Stein et al. (1999) and Woo (2003) found evidence of the effects of electoral rules on budget surpluses 
expressed as a percentage of GDP. Persson and Tabellini (2003) also present evidence of the link between 
electoral rules and three different dimensions of fiscal policy: the size of government, measured by 
central government spending and revenue as a percentage of GDP; welfare state spending; and the budget 
surplus as a percentage of GDP.
7 Stein et al. (1999), Woo (2003) and Persson and Tabellini (2003) argue that presidential regimes create 
considerably smaller governments than parliamentary regimes. 
8 Persson and Tabellini (2003) show that the effect of forms of government on welfare state spending is 
stronger in older and better democracies (higher values of AGE and lower values of GASTIL). 
Conversely, older and better democracies are associated with larger welfare states only under 
parliamentary regimes – proportional electoral rules.
9 See Rodrik (1996), Kauffman and Stallings (1991), and Berg and Sachs (1988). 
10 Persson and Tabellini (2003) show that higher levels of income inequality affect welfare spending, 
despite the fact that these pull in opposite directions under different forms of government. Higher levels 
of inequality are associated with a smaller welfare state in parliamentary democracies, contrary to 
expectations. In presidential regimes, inequality is instead associated with higher levels of welfare 
spending.
11 See, for example, Woo (1999) for the first econometric evidence that income inequality is a significant 
determinant of public deficits, in a cross-section of 91 countries, for the period 1970-90. See also Woo 
(2003).7
there are few empirical works about the effects of social polarization in fiscal 
cyclicality
12. Following Woo (2005), we will check the effect of social polarization on 
the cyclicality of both government expenditures and revenues, by including three 
alternative measures of income inequality: AGINIHI80, AGINIHI and AGINI80. 
Differently from Woo (2005), however,  our main measure is AGINIHI80, which 
includes only coefficients in the 1980s, because data availability is not uniform among 
the countries, and comparability becomes easier if we take a particular decade average. 
The 1980s were selected because data availability is higher in this decade, and, at the 
same time, it is relatively recent. We also interact our income inequality measures with 
the age and quality of democracies (AGE / GASTIL), in order to check to what extent 
the influence of these inequalities on fiscal cyclicality is less prominent in older/better 
democracies. In a similar vein, and following Woo (2005), we also consider three 
composite indexes of social polarization: SOCPOL1 = AGINIHI * (1-POLCONIII); 
SOCPOL2 = AGINIHI80 * (1-POLCONIII); SOCPOL3 = AGINI80 * (1-POLCONIII). 
The purpose of these indexes is to test whether good institutions can, to some extent,
alleviate the problem of high polarization.
3.7 – Type of political regime
A different class of variables has to do with the type of regime (REGIME). To 
our knowledge, no other works have  considered these variables. We consider three 
types of regime: civilian, military-civilian and military. Again, we interact the type of 
regime with the age and quality of democracies in order to check if each type of regime 
produces different effects on the cyclical patterns of fiscal policy in older and better 
democracies.
3.8 – The role of the IMF programmes 
An innovative contribution of our work is the inclusion of the variable IMFINT. 
This is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if there was any kind of conditional 
intervention by the IMF in a country, in the respective year. The main purpose of the 
inclusion of this variable is to discover whether IMF interventions play any significant 
role in the cyclical behaviour of public expenditures and revenues. We know that any 
IMF programme includes a certain degree of conditionality regarding the formulation of 
economic policy. Fiscal policy can naturally change its guidelines if the Fund is 
“present” in a country. So, we thought that it would be useful to discover to what extent 
such interventions can affect the cyclical pattern of government expenditure and 
revenue. Frequently, when a government calls for the Fund’s financial aid, this occurs 
in “bad times”, with reduced or negative real GDP growth rates and large public and 
external deficits. The traditional IMF formula includes making heavy expenditure cuts 
and raising tax rates, causing fiscal policy to behave in a procyclical manner. So, IMF 
conditionality is expected to contribute to a procyclical behaviour of government 
expenditure and revenue. We interact IMFINT with the age and quality of democracies, 
the electoral rules and the forms of government. Our purpose is to test whether IMF 
   
12 Woo (2005) is an exception. See Section 2.8
interventions have a different impact on procyclicality in older and better democracies 
and in the presence of non-majoritarian electoral rules and parliamentary regimes.
3.9 – Development of financial systems
We should also take into account the possible role played by the degree of 
development of financial systems in each country. This is particularly interesting since 
we mix OECD countries with Latin American countries in our sample. In fact, fiscal 
deficits may be more easily financed by the issuing of bonds (thus avoiding inflationary 
finance) by countries with more highly developed financial markets. Lane (2003) argues 
that an extension of his work through the inclusion of some non-OECD countries in the 
sample would involve developing a framework that was able to take into account the 
possible role played by international financial crises in inducing forced fiscal 
procyclicality in some emerging market economies. More highly developed financial 
systems actually enable countries to better protect themselves from the effects of 
international financial crises. According to Gavin and Perotti (1997), developing 
countries are more prone to run procyclical fiscal policies due to a lack of access to 
international credit markets (see Section 2). Following this idea, we include a variable 
FINDEPTH
13 – liquid liabilities (M3) expressed as a percentage of GDP (from WDI 
2004, World Bank) – as a measure of the degree of development of a financial system
14. 
Although there are some empirical works focusing on the effects of this variable on 
deficit bias, as is the case of Woo (2003), its impact on cyclicality has, to our 
knowledge, not been empirically studied so far. Following the argument of Gavin and 
Perotti (1997), we expect that higher values of FINDEPTH (more developed financial 
systems) have an anti-cyclical effect on fiscal policy. In addition, we interact 
FINDEPTH with the age and quality of the democracies, the electoral rules and the 
forms of government.
3.10 – Government fragmentation
A branch of empirical research on fiscal policy focuses on so-called government 
fragmentation. Woo (2003) considers three ways of measuring government 
fragmentation
15: the number of seats held by the largest party in the lower house, a party 
fractionalization index and a measurement of coalition composition. We will use the 
   
13 Woo (2003) uses the same variable, although  with a different label (ILLY). According to his 
conclusions (p. 394), a 10 percent increase in ILLY is associated with an additional deficit of 0.6% (as a 
percentage of GDP). His argument in defence of this relationship is that countries with highly developed 
financial markets can more easily finance fiscal deficits by issuing bonds without having to resort to 
inflationary finance.
14 According to Pitzel and Uusküla (2005), three main definitions can be used to measure financial depth: 
the ratio of monetary aggregate to GDP, the ratio of debt to GDP (indebtedness), and the ratio of stock 
market capitalization to GDP. Although these sets of variables are proxies for the same feature, they 
should be treated separately in order to capture the role of different structures of financial markets among 
the countries. For example, stock market capitalization is a proxy for the availability of non-bank finance. 
Following the suggestion of Woo (2003), we used the first definition, the M3 to GDP ratio.
15 Volkerink and de Haan (2001) present evidence according to which more fragmented governments 
have higher deficits.9
same variables (SEAT, PARFRACT and COAL) to check their influence on our 
estimated parameters of cyclicality. These variables are supposed to reflect the possible 
role played by the voracity effect on the cyclicality of fiscal policy, since features such 
as a weaker position of the largest party in the legislature, or a more fractionalized
parliament, or weaker governments (coalitions/minority governments), tend to intensify 
the common pool problem (see Section 2).
Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999) broadened this line of research by using the 
number of spending ministers as a further measure of fragmentation. In our work, we 
therefore include the variable CABSIZE (the size of the cabinet, referring to the number 
of ministers). Hallerberg and Strauch (2002) used some fragmentation variables, such as 
the government ideology, the constellation of parties in government and parliament, the 
size of the cabinet and the number of policy-actors with veto authority. However, they 
could not find any systematic interaction of these variables with output fluctuations. 
Woo (2003) also used some fragmentation  variables (number of ministers, party 
coalitions, party fractionalization and the position of the largest party in the legislature),
although in this case in order to study the deficit bias
16.
4 - The Empirical Strategy
In order to obtain a pattern of cyclicality of fiscal policy, we begin by running
time-series estimations, for each country, of the following model:
(1)
The variable  t G corresponds to fiscal aggregates – central government real total 
expenditure (REALEXP) and real total revenue (REALREVE), for each country. 
REALGDP is real gross domestic product. HPTRENDS is the trend component of 
REALGDP obtained through the Hodrick-Prescott filter. A time trend t is also added. 
t D are year dummies.  t e is the residual component.
We included a time trend in all estimations. Since it was not always statistically 
significant, we decided to keep the trend just for the regressions where it is significant at 
least at a 10% level ofsignificance
17.
We also include year dummies taking the value 1 if, in a given year, the fiscal 
aggregate (expenditure or revenue) varies by 40% or more
18. But as we did with the 
time trends, we considered only those dummies with significant coefficients, at least at a 
10% level of significance
19. To our knowledge, no other studies appear to implement a 
   
16 He argues that a larger cabinet size (the number of ministers in the cabinet) is strongly associated with 
larger public deficits.
17 Tables A1 and A2 detail when the time trend was retained. 
18 The only exception is Austria in 1980. In fact, in 1980, the variation of the real revenue was about 33%, 
but since this was clearly a result of a break of  comparability in the data, we decided to include the 
dummy in the revenue regression. An appendix containing graphs of the evolution of real expenditures 
and real revenues is available from the author upon request.
19 See Tables A1 and A2.
( ) t t t t t HPTRENDS REALGDP D t G e b f d a + D - D + + + = D log log log10
systematic procedure for dealing with outliers, which are actually quite  common in 
developing countries.
As is clear, our measure of the economic cycle is the first difference in the
output gap, and we take the dependent variable as the growth rate of real expenditure (or 
revenue). We can then interpret the coefficient b as the response of the growth rate of 
real expenditure (or revenue) to a one percent change in the first difference in the output 
gap. A positive value of  b in the expenditure equation means a procyclical fiscal 
policy, whilst a negative estimated parameter indicates countercyclicality. In the 
revenue equation, a positive value of b means countercyclical revenues.
Other authors use similar measures of fiscal cyclicality. Woo (2005) and Lane 
(2003) use the relationship between the real growth of government spending and the 
growth rate of real GDP. Arreaza et al. (1999) also use the regression-based estimates of 
cyclicality in their investigation into the cyclical pattern of fiscal policy in the OECD. 
Nevertheless, as was noted by Woo (2005), there is no consensus on the most correct 
way to measure cyclicality. For instance, Talvi and Végh (2005) and Kaminski et al. 
(2004) used the correlation coefficient between government spending and the HP-
filtered output.
Equation (1) is estimated by the  ordinary least squares (OLS) method. We 
corrected for first-order autocorrelation. We clearly have a problem of endogeneity in
our measurement of the economic cycle, since the output gap (and its first difference) is 
influenced by fiscal policy. But we are not interested in the structural-form relationship
between fiscal policy and the cycle. According to Lane (2003), if our main goal is to 
obtain a measurement of cyclicality, the reduced-form  relationship  may be more 
appropriate, therefore including any feedback from fiscal variables to the output gap. 
That is why we use the OLS method instead of instrumental variables estimation
20. The 
estimated betas are presented in Tables A1 and A2. 
In the following step, we try to explain cross-country variations in the 
coefficients  of  cyclicality estimated above, with the following cross-sectional 
specification: 
(2)
i b ˆ is the vector of the estimated betas in the first step. a is a constant term.  i Z
includes some commonly employed economic controls (GDP per capita, openness to 
trade, the share of the population over 65 years old and the rate of inflation). GDP per 
capita (GDPPC) is included to control for the potential effect of the level of 
development on fiscal cyclicality. Woo (2003) uses the log of real per capita GDP, 
however, in order to control for the effects of economic backwardness on public 
deficits, which is a different policy dimension to the one studied in the present work. 
Trade openness (TRADE) is important since open economies are more prone to external 
risks, so that  the government should promote consumption smoothing through a 
   
20 If we were interested in the structural-form relationship between fiscal policy and the cycle, it would be 
necessary to use an instrument for our measurement of the cycle. 
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countercyclical policy, as argued by Rodrik (1998). We also include the share of the 
population over 65 (POP65), as countries with a large share of retired people will feel
greater pressure on their social security systems
21. Finally, following Woo (2003), we 
consider INFLATION. In the several estimations of the role of political and institutional 
variables on the cyclicality of government spending and revenues, we only include the 
controls that are statistically significant at least at a 10% level ofsignificance.
Finally,  i W includes all the political and institutional variables described in 
Section 3. These are our relevant regressors. Each regressor is a country average of 
yearly observations
22. In some regressions, we consider a dummy LAM equal to 1 if a 
country is in Latin America.
We run White heteroskedasticity-consistent estimations by OLS. We also reran 
regressions by weighted least squares (WLS). Indeed, the beta coefficients obtained in 
equation (1) are estimated with different degrees of precision; for the purposes of a 
sensitivity analysis, we seek to control for this fact in the second step estimation
23. 
5 – Estimation Results 
Tables A1 and A2 include the estimated coefficients of cyclicality of 
government expenditure and revenue from equation 1.
Tables B1 to B8 present the OLS estimates when the dependent variable is the 
vector of the estimated coefficients of cyclicality of government expenditure. Tables C1 
to C8 present the same information, but, in this case, when the dependent variable is the 
vector of the estimated coefficients of cyclicality of fiscal revenue (See, in both cases, 
equation 2). 
5.1 – The cyclical behaviour of government expenditure
Concerning the cyclicality of government expenditure, our main result is related 
to the difference between the pattern found in the  OECD and Latin American 
economies. The left panel of Table A1 presents the estimated cyclicality coefficients for 
the OECD countries. Although the average parameter is negative (-0.04), there is only 
scant evidence of countercyclicality. In fact, if we exclude Sweden, which presents the 
highest absolute value, the average cyclicality of this group of countries becomes 
positive. Apart from this, there is a great deal of heterogeneity between the estimated 
betas, and the number of countries exhibiting countercyclicality equals the number of 
countries with procyclical expenditure. Portugal, New Zealand, Hungary, Germany, 
   
21 This control was also used by Woo (2003), although in a study about the deficit bias. We acknowledge 
that the link between this variable and cyclicality is not clear.
22 Not all the available observations were used to compute the averages. If, for example, in the estimation 
of the coefficient of cyclicality, we have only considered observations from 1970 to 1998 for a certain 
country, all the regressors of the second step for that country are averages of the observations made 
during the same period, despite the availability of other observations. We believe that this reinforces the 
coherence of our empirical results.
23 An appendix with these results is available from the author upon request.12
Japan and Switzerland exhibit a clear procyclical pattern, while Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, Korea, France and Denmark, for example, exhibit countercyclicality.
In Latin America, the results are much more homogeneous among countries (left 
panel of Table A2). A clear procyclical behaviour of government expenditure can be 
observed, with Ecuador being the only exception, with an estimated beta of -0.35. The 
average beta is 1.15, with the maximum estimated coefficient belonging to Guatemala 
(2.91) and the lowest (excluding Ecuador) belonging to Uruguay (0.17). In general, 
procyclicality is statistically significant, confirming the results of other related studies 
(Talvi and Végh, 2005; Stein et al., 1999; Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Gavin et al., 1996).
5.2 – Determinants of the cyclicality of government expenditure
Socio-political variables were the first category considered as possible 
determinants of the cyclicality of fiscal policy and of the differences found between 
countries. As we can see in Table B1, in general these variables play no significant role. 
COUPS is an exception: Column 3 shows that a higher number of coups d’état is 
associated with a lower coefficient of cyclicality.
The age of democracy presents no statistical significance, although in all the 
specifications (Table B2, Columns 1, 1a and 3) its coefficient presents a negative sign, 
suggesting that older democracies tend to allow government expenditure to play its 
Keynesian stabilization role. This result does not hold when we interact the age of 
democracy with the dummy LAM. According to the results shown in Column 1a, where 
we consider the dummy LAM to assume the value 1, this effect becomes positive (1.26 
= 1.51 – 0.25). The results are similar if we include AGE jointly with the quality of 
institutions (GASTIL). Column 3 shows these results. Individually considered, AGE 
and GASTIL do not have a significant impact on estimated betas, but if we analyse the 
role of AGE in Latin American countries, we can see that when AGE rises by 0.1 the 
cyclicality coefficient rises by 0.108 ((1.77 – 0.69) / 10). Political constraints have a far 
more significant impact on cyclicality. According to the results shown in Column 5a, 
the effect is strongly negative in the OECD countries, with a rise in POLCONIII (Index 
of political constraints) of 0.1 leading to a decrease of beta of 0.314. If we only consider 
the Latin American economies, the results change sharply. In fact, the coefficient of 
POLCONIII becomes slightly positive (0.35), meaning that the contribution of the level 
of checks and balances leads to less procyclicality only in the OECD economies. The 
results for the whole sample are statistically insignificant, as we can see from Column 5.
Electoral rules and forms of government tend to be associated with differences 
across countries in the cyclicality of government spending. Table B3 shows the main 
results. Jointly considered, the dummies for the electoral rules (MAJ) and the forms of 
government (PRES) present no significant impact. Nevertheless, Columns 2 and 3 show 
important results. Majoritarian formulas play opposite roles in the OECD and Latin 
American countries. In the  OECD countries, the shift from a proportional to a 
majoritarian electoral rule is related to a decrease in the coefficient of cyclicality by 
0.38, while in Latin America the same shift is associated with an increase of estimated 
betas by 0.33 (see Column 2). The form of government is not a significant source of 
differences in cyclicality, as we can see in Columns 3 and 3a, unless we combine it with 13
the age of democracies (Column 7). As is clear, the results differ when we distinguish 
between older and younger democracies. Shifting from a parliamentary to a presidential 
regime reduces the parameter of procyclicality by close to 1.01 in younger democracies 
and increases it by close to 0.55 in older democracies. Finally, we can observe a 
significant impact on cyclicality of a simultaneous shift to a majoritarian formula and a 
presidential regime. The results shown in Column 4 allow us to conclude that such a 
political change leads to a reduction of the coefficient of cyclicalityby 0.42.
Table B4 presents the relationships  between income inequality and the 
cyclicality of government expenditure. Income inequality, measured by the average of 
the “high quality” Gini coefficients
24, positively affects the coefficient of cyclicality. In 
fact, according to the results shown in Column 1, when AGINIHI rises by 10 points, 
procyclicality rises by 0.7. When we analyse the whole sample separately, we can see 
that this impact is stronger in Latin America than in the  OECD countries, but 
nonetheless positive in both cases (0.5 and 0.4, respectively). Similar conclusions can 
be extracted from the analysis of the results in Columns 2 and 3, since AGINIHI80 and 
AGINI80 are alternative, but quite similar measures of income inequality (see Section 
3.6). This procedure reinforces the robustness of the results and confirms the theoretical 
assumptions according to which high levels of income inequality are an important 
source of procyclicality  in government expenditure (Woo, 2005). These effects also 
depend on the age of democracies. Columns 4, 5 and 6 show the results of the 
interaction of our measures of income inequality with the age of democracies. Again, 
the results are very similar across the three specifications, although the first one presents 
a weaker statistical significance. For example, from  Column 5 we are allowed to 
conclude that the effects of income inequality on the cyclical behaviour of government 
expenditure are far stronger in older democracies than in younger ones. An increase by 
10 points in AGINIHI80 leads to an increase in the parameter of cyclicality by 1.8 in 
older democracies (the extreme case being AGE=1) and 0.5 in younger democracies 
(considering AGE=0). We also tried to discover whether the procyclical effect of 
income inequality interacts with the quality of democracies, measured by GASTIL. The 
results shown in Columns 7 to 9 do not support this hypothesis. In Columns 10 to 12 we 
estimate the impact of our composite indexes of social polarization on the cyclicality of 
government spending. The main goal is to check whether the quality of institutions is 
important for defining the impact of Gini coefficients on the estimated cyclicality. In a 
certain way, this procedure is no more than a robustness analysis in relation to the 
results reported in Columns 7 to 9 (or even 4 to 9), since we have no strong reason for
excluding the hypothesis under which POLCONIII is a reasonable indicator of the 
quality of institutions, as well as GASTIL (or AGE). In fact, none of the estimated 
coefficients in Columns 10 to 12 is statistically significant. This clearly means that we 
could not find any evidence that better institutions mitigate the procyclical impact of 
income inequality. Thus, in this respect, our results do not support the conclusions 
obtained by Woo (2005).
We also intended to discover whether there exists any influence of the type of 
political regime on the cyclicality of government expenditure (Table B5). The results 
are quite clear. Estimated coefficients are always statistically insignificant in all our 
specifications, suggesting that the hypothesis according to which civilian, military or 
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mixed regimes could lead to different cyclical patterns of government spending does not 
hold.
Concerning the role of IMF interventions, whose results are shown in Table B6, 
we can say that, in general, those interventions display no significant link with
cyclicality. Considered individually (Columns 1 to 1b), these programmes adopted by 
the  IMF do not exhibit any  influence  on the cyclical behaviour of government 
expenditure. In Columns 2 and 2a, the results become slightly more interesting, since 
when we try to check whether the age of democracies is a determinant of the effect of 
IMF interventions, the parameter of the interaction variable (IMFINT*(1-AGE)) is 
statistically significant. For example, from  Column 2, we can conclude that IMF 
programmes are associated with procyclicality only in older democracies (the limit, 
assuming AGE=1, corresponds to the USA), with the rise in IMFINT of 0.1 leading to 
an increase of the coefficient of cyclicality by 0.184. In the extreme case of younger 
democracies (the limit, assuming AGE=0, corresponds to Haiti), the same change in 
IMFINT decreases the parameter of  cyclicality by 0.085. Although the age of 
democracies is an important source of differences in the role of the IMF, their quality 
plays no role, as can be seen from the results shown in Columns 3 and 3a. The impact of 
electoral formulas is also insignificant in determining the influence ofIMF interventions 
on the cyclical properties of government spending. Columns 4 and 4a show evidence 
supporting this conclusion. Nevertheless, the form of government seems to be 
important, since from Column 5 we can observe that the estimated beta actually changes 
when we analyse the role of the IMF in presidential or parliamentary regimes. In fact, 
an increase in IMFINT by 0.1 decreases the parameter of cyclicality by 0.158 only in 
presidential regimes, while in parliamentary regimes, this parameter is increased by 
0.039.
Table B7 shows the estimated results when the determinant of cyclicality 
considered is the degree of development of financial systems. Only Columns 1a and 1b 
present significant results, but the estimated effect is the opposite of what would be 
expected in theoretical terms (see Section 3.9). According to the results of Column 1a, 
an increase of 10 points in FINDEPTH leads to an increase of only 0.09 in the estimated 
betas. As we can see, the effect is not significantly different from zero, but it is positive, 
suggesting that a higher degree of development of financial systems could be associated 
with a higher procyclicality of government expenditure. Not only do all the remaining 
estimated regressions produce insignificant results, but the coefficients of FINDEPTH 
are also always positive (except in Column 3). In fact, even if we interact FINDEPTH 
with the age and quality of institutions, and with the electoral formula and type of 
government, no effects can be found on the cyclicality of government spending.
The hypothesis of the influence of government fragmentation measures on the 
cyclicality of government expenditure is not supported by the data. Table B8 shows 
evidence that the position of the largest party in the legislature, the party 
fractionalization index and the size of cabinet are not relevant variables explaining the 
cyclical properties of spending since none of the associated coefficients is statistically 
significant. The exception is the variable measuring party coalitions, but even here the 
effect is limited. In fact, in Column 3a, we can see that the coefficient of COAL is not 
statistically significant, but the interaction of COAL with the dummy LAM results in a 
significant parameter, suggesting that in Latin America some effect can be observed. 
So, an increase of 1 unit in COAL (for example, from a situation of no coalition – the 15
case in which COAL=0, to a more than one party coalition government – the case in 
which COAL=1) increases the coefficient of cyclicality by 0.65 only in Latin American 
countries. The effect in the OECD countries is statistically insignificant.
Estimations by WLS
25, considering the absolute t-statistics of the first step 
regressions as weights, produced, in general, quite robust results, meaning that the main 
conclusions do not change. Income inequality  retains its association  with more 
procyclical expenditure and the quality of institutions does not change that relationship. 
IMF interventions do not play any role in the cyclicality of expenditure, as we had 
observed from the estimations by OLS. A nuance to the OLS results is that 
coalition/minority governments seem more prone to engaging in procyclical 
expenditure.
5.3 – The cyclical behaviour of government revenues
In terms of government revenues, there are far fewer differences  between
countries than were found in the case of expenditure. On average, revenues are clearly 
countercyclical (positive values of estimated betas) in both the OECD (average beta 
equals 0.67) and Latin American countries (average beta equals 1.03). In Latin America, 
all the countries exhibit a positive coefficient (right panel of Table A2). In the OECD, 
there are only four exceptions – Sweden, Ireland, Italy and Australia – but none of these 
betas are statistically significant (right panel of Table A1). Despite the absence of any
heterogeneity  in the cyclical pattern of government revenues, there is a question of 
magnitude that needs to be explained. For example, the estimated coefficient for the 
Dominican Republic reaches 2.39, while in Venezuela, Belgium and Netherlands that 
same coefficient is only 0.26.
5.4 – Determinants of the cyclicality of government revenues
In general, the explanatory power of the regressions is weaker than that obtained 
through the analysis of the cyclicality of government expenditure. We included the ratio 
of revenues to GDP in all the revenue regressions in order to control for the effects of 
the automatic stabilizers, since these are essentially on the revenue side (the results are 
not reported here). Not only were the coefficients always statistically insignificant 
(instead of being significantly above zero, as expected), but also the explanatory power 
of the regressions remained almost unchanged. 
From the set of socio-political instability variables, only the number of 
government crises is significantly associated with the cyclicality of government 
revenues. Column 1 of Table C1 shows that a unitary increase in GOVTCRIS reduces 
the estimated betas by 0.69, suggesting that greater instability is associated with higher 
procyclicality of fiscal policy on the revenue side, as we expected. Column 1a confirms 
this result and allows us to conclude that the effect of government crises is numerically 
much  greater in Latin American countries, although the coefficient of 
GOVTCRIS*LAM is not statistically significant. So, in the OECD, an increase of 1 unit 
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in GOVTCRIS reduces the coefficient of cyclicality by 0.62, while in Latin America, 
this effect increases to 1.94 (corresponding to the absolute value of -0.62 + (-1.32)).
In contrast to what happened in the case of government expenditure, the quality 
of institutions, measured by GASTIL, influences the cyclicality of government 
revenues. According to the results shown in Column 2a of Table C2, an increase of 1 
point in GASTIL (worse institutions) is associated with an increase of 0.19 percent in
the parameter  of  cyclicality in the  OECD. In Latin America, the opposite effect is 
found. An increase of 1 point in GASTIL is associated with a decrease in the coefficient
of cyclicality by 0.1 percent. This suggests that weaker institutions are associated with
more procyclical policies on the revenue side in Latin American countries, although the 
opposite is the case in the OECD countries. The index of democratization (POLITY) is 
not statistically significant, as is also the case with the political constraints index. We 
stress once more that POLCONIII was actually a determinant of the cyclicality of 
government expenditure.
Presidential regimes are a source of less procyclical policy , as we can see in 
Column 1 of Table C3. Controlling for the electoral rule, a shift from a parliamentary to 
a presidential regime increases the parameter of  cyclicality by 0.44. But when we 
distinguish between the  OECD and Latin America (Column 3) the  results  are 
completely different. The effect of presidential regimes in the  OECD becomes 
insignificant, but in Latin America the same shift increases procyclicality. Column 4 
shows that a simultaneous shift to majoritarian elections and a presidential regime 
increases the coefficient of cyclicality by 0.65 (more countercyclical/less procyclical 
policy). The age of democracies also plays a role in this puzzle. When AGE=1 (older 
democracies), a shift to a presidential regime reduces procyclicality by 0.97 (Column 7), 
but when AGE=0 (younger democracies) the effect is not statistically significant. Better 
institutions also allow presidential regimes to reduce procyclicality (Column 8).
The results of the influence of income inequality are quite different from those 
obtained in section 5.2. In fact, Column 1 of Table C4 suggests that a rise of 10 percent
in AGINIHI leads to an increase of the estimated betas by 0.3 (less procyclicality). The 
analysis of the effects in both the OECD and Latin America separately produces no 
statistically significant conclusions (Column 1a). If we consider AGINIHI80 or 
AGINI80 instead of AGINIHI, the  results remain almost unchanged. The age of 
democracy also exhibits  an  influence on the impact of income inequality on the 
estimated betas. In older democracies, the effects of income inequality tend to be lower. 
Column 4 suggests that when AGE=1, an increase of 10 points in AGINIHI leads to a 
rise in the estimated beta by 0.9, while when AGE =0, this increase amounts to only 0.1. 
The results obtained using the alternative measures (Columns 5 and 6) of income 
inequality (AGINIHI80 and AGINI80) are basically the same. As far as the role of the 
quality of institutions is concerned, the results of the impact of income inequality on the 
cyclicality of revenues are quite different. Under the best institutions (GASTIL=1) an 
increase in AGINIHI of 10 points leads to an increase in the estimated beta by 0.6 
(Column 7). But in worse institutions (higher values of GASTIL), this effect results in a 
decrease in the coefficient of cyclicality (for values of GASTIL higher than 4). This 
clearly suggests that income inequality is a source of countercyclicality in government 
revenue only in better institutions (values of GASTIL lower than 4), while the opposite 
is the case in worse democracies. Once again, results are quite similar in Columns 8 and 
9. In Columns 10 to 12, we check to see whether the composite indexes of social 17
polarization determine the cyclicality of fiscal policy on the revenue side. The 
procedure is similar to the one adopted in the estimation of  the  cyclical pattern of 
expenditure. In fact, as we said before, the interaction of Gini coefficients with the 
index of political constraints (POLCONIII) is somewhat similar to checking whether the 
quality of institutions determines the cyclical impact of income inequality. In this 
respect, our results are not statistically significant, suggesting that political constraints 
do not change the countercyclical influence of income inequality on the cyclicality of 
fiscal policy on the revenue side.
As was the case with government expenditure, we were not able to find any 
relationship between the type of regime and the cyclicality of government revenues. 
Table C5 shows the results.
In general, IMF interventions have no significant influence on the cyclicality of 
revenues (Table C6). The most significant result is shown in Column 4, according to 
which, when IMFINT=1, the coefficient of  cyclicality decreases by 2.69 (more 
procyclical policy on the revenue side) if a country has majoritarian elections. The 
effect becomes far smaller if a country has proportional elections (only 0.28). Column 3 
shows the influence of the quality of institutions. For worse democracies (higher values 
of GASTIL), IMF interventions lead to more procyclical policies.
The degree of development of financial systems plays a more significant role in 
the cyclicality of government revenues than in the cyclicality of expenditure. Column 1 
of Table C7 shows that an increase of 10 points in FINDEPTH decreases the coefficient 
of  cyclicality by 0.06. This suggests that countries with more developed financial 
systems are more prone to engage in procyclical policies, although the effect is close to 
zero. Columns 2 and 2a present the results of the interaction of FINDEPTH with the age 
of  the  democracy. In younger democracies (AGE closer to zero) the effect is 
qualitatively similar to that  shown in  Column 1, but quantitatively higher. In older 
democracies (AGE closer to one), the effect is very close to zero (Column 2a). In 
Column 2, we can see that an increase of 10 points in FINDEPTH leads to an increase 
in the parameter of cyclicality by only 0.1 (more countercyclical revenues). Column 4 
shows that countries with majoritarian elections are more prone to increase the 
countercyclicality of revenue after an increase in the degree of development of the 
financial system (-0.0002+0.03). In the presence of proportional elections (MAJ=0), the 
effect of FINDEPTH becomes very close to zero and statistically insignificant.
Government fragmentation has some effect on the cross-country differences in 
estimated betas. Column 1 of Table C8 shows that a weaker position of the largest party 
in parliament is associated with a more procyclical policy. An increase of 1 in SEAT 
reduces the coefficient of cyclicality by 0.23. Nevertheless, results are different between 
the OECD and Latin American countries. Column 1a presents evidence that in Latin 
American countries, the weakness of the largest party is an important source of 
procyclicality, while in the OECD that effect is not statistically different from zero (and 
is much lower). From the remaining explanatory variables, only the party 
fractionalization index (PARFRACT) influences the estimated betas. An increase of 0.1 
in the index decreases the coefficient of cyclicality by 0.145, suggesting that a larger 
number of parties in the legislature is associated with a more procyclical policy on the 
revenue side.18
As was the case with the expenditure regressions, and in order to carry out a 
sensitivity analysis, we reran the regressions by WLS
26, using the absolute values of t-
statistics (obtained in the estimations of the coefficients of revenue cyclicality) as 
weights. The results are reasonably robust, with few changes relative to those estimated 
by OLS. Variable GASTIL loses its power for explaining the cyclicality of government 
policy on the revenue side. As far as the remaining results are concerned,  the 
conclusions are basically the same as those obtained by OLS.
6 – Conclusions
The aim of the present work was both to obtain the parameters of cyclicality of 
central government real expenditure and revenue, and to discover whether political and 
institutional factors are useful for explaining cross-country differences in such patterns 
of cyclical behaviour. We collected a broad set of variables relating to these political 
and institutional features, some  of which had been used in previous studies on 
cyclicality (Section 2), others in studies on other dimensions of fiscal policy, while yet
others were ‘new’. 
Government expenditure is procyclical in Latin America, but, on average,
weakly countercyclical in the OECD countries. Government revenues are procyclical in 
both the OECD and Latin America, although the procyclicality is stronger in Latin 
America.
As far as the determinants of the cyclicality of government expenditure are 
concerned, some results are worth stressing. Political constraints are a source of less 
procyclicality, but this can only be noted in the OECD. Majoritarian elections induce 
more procyclicality in Latin America and less procyclicality in the OECD. A shift from 
a parliamentary to a presidential regime increases procyclicality in older democracies.
Using a different measure of the economic cycle (the first difference in the output gap 
instead of real output growth), we were also able to confirm some of Woo’s (2005) 
results, according to which high levels of income inequality  increase procyclicality.
However, unlike that author, we could not find any support for the hypothesis that better 
institutions mitigate the procyclical effect of income inequality. 
In general, IMF interventions have no influence on the cyclical pattern of 
government expenditure. The ‘presence’ of the IMF in a country increases expenditure 
procyclicality only in older democracies and in parliamentary regimes. Likewise, the 
degree of development of financial systems appears to be unrelated to the cyclicality of 
expenditure. Furthermore, when its coefficient is statistically significant, it presents the 
opposite sign of what would be expected. It is also the case that, in general, government 
fragmentation plays no significant role.
As far as the cyclicality of government revenue is concerned, the most important 
conclusion to be drawn is that, in general, regressions have a weak explanatory power. 
Most of the coefficients are statistically insignificant. Nevertheless, we were able to find
that higher levels of socio-political instability (measured by the number of government 
crises) lead to a more procyclical policy, as expected, and that the effect is stronger in 
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Latin America. The quality of institutions is important, in contrast to what happened in 
the case of  government expenditure. Thus, in the presence of worse institutions,
governments are more prone to pursue more procyclical policies on the revenue side in 
Latin America, while the opposite is the case in the OECD. Presidential regimes lead to 
more procyclical policies only in Latin American countries, but a simultaneous shift 
both to majoritarian elections and presidential regimes increases countercyclicality. The 
same effect is produced after a shift to a presidential regime in an environment where 
there are better institutions. Surprisingly, income inequality leads to less procyclical 
policies, although the effect is weaker in older democracies. An increase in the degree 
of development of financial systems leads to greater countercyclicality only in the 
presence of majoritarian elections. In contrast to what happened in the case of 
government expenditure, we were able to find evidence of the contribution of higher 
levels of government fragmentation to a higher degree of procyclicality of fiscal policy 




Significant at Significant at
Australia 42 -0.44 -1.01 - No trend 42 -0.10 -0.22 - No trend
Austria 34 0.09 0.39 3 5% 34 0.54 3.36 *** 3 5%
Belgium 28 -0.25 -0.94 - 1% 38 0.26 1.23 1 1%
Canada 36 0.03 0.08 - 1% 36 1.25 2.59 ** - 10%
Denmark 34 -0.54 -1.17 - 1% 34 1.04 1.78 * - 10%
Finland 38 -0.30 -0.83 - No trend 33 0.65 2.29 ** - No trend
France 25 -0.58 -2.50 ** - 1% 37 0.84 3.04 *** 1 1%
Germany 27 0.45 1.49 - No trend 27 0.98 3.43 *** - No trend
Greece 39 0.06 0.12 - 10% 31 0.69 1.65 - No trend
Hungary 22 0.68 1.75 * - No trend 22 1.28 3.78 *** - No trend
Ireland 38 0.25 0.45 - 10% 38 -0.49 -1.10 - No trend
Italy 38 -0.13 -0.64 - 1% 38 -0.18 -1.25 - 10%
Japan 33 0.37 1.33 2 10% 33 0.62 1.83 * 1 No trend
Korea 37 -0.64 -0.84 1 No trend 37 1.09 2.25 ** 1 No trend
Netherlands 38 -0.08 -0.27 - 1% 38 0.26 0.73 - 1%
New Zealand 38 0.79 2.29 ** - 10% 38 1.00 2.36 ** - No trend
Norway 37 0.16 0.33 1 5% 37 1.57 4.32 *** 1 10%
Portugal 21 1.06 1.69 - No trend 21 1.69 3.14 *** - No trend
Spain 36 -0.25 -0.57 - 1% 36 0.78 2.09 ** - 10%
Sweden 41 -1.80 -2.92 *** - 1% 41 -0.74 -0.89 - 10%
Switzerland 42 0.33 0.83 - 1% 42 0.69 2.24 ** - No trend
Turkey 14 0.59 1.10 - No trend 14 0.98 2.67 ** - No trend
United Kingdom 39 -0.67 -2.08 ** - 10% 39 -0.30 -0.72 - No trend
United States 42 -0.23 -0.79 - 10% 38 1.64 4.38 *** - No trend
Mean -0.04 Mean 0.67
Max 1.06 Max 1.69
Min -1.80 Min -0.74
Trend Trend
Significant at Significant at
Chile 27 0.45 2.16 ** - 10% 27 0.78 3.53 *** - No trend
Costa Rica 32 2.00 2.84 *** - No trend 32 1.43 3.47 *** - No trend
Dominican Republic 38 2.26 5.63 *** - No trend 38 2.39 6.91 *** 2 No trend
Ecuador 38 -0.35 -1.03 2 No trend 38 0.32 0.69 1 No trend
El Salvador 40 0.91 1.88 * - No trend 40 1.30 2.24 ** - No trend
Guatemala 41 2.91 3.07 *** - No trend 41 1.25 1.50 - No trend
Haiti 36 0.82 0.96 2 No trend 36 0.96 1.15 2 No trend
Honduras 40 0.54 1.00 - No trend 40 1.41 4.58 *** - No trend
Mexico 23 0.41 0.62 - No trend 23 0.48 1.68 * - No trend
Panama 40 1.69 5.23 *** 1 10% 40 0.85 3.09 *** 1 10%
Paraguay 41 1.09 1.90 * - No trend 41 1.16 2.48 ** - No trend
Trinidad & Tobago 21 1.65 2.05 * 1 No trend 21 1.57 2.54 ** - 5%
Uruguay 26 0.17 1.28 - No trend 26 0.30 2.20 ** - No trend
Venezuela 41 1.51 3.81 *** - No trend 41 0.26 0.50 1 No trend
Mean 1.15 Mean 1.03
Max 2.91 Max 2.39
Min -0.35 Min 0.26
* Significant at 10% level
** Significant at 5% level
*** Significant at 1% level
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Table A1: Cyclicality coefficients - OECD Countries
Expenditure Regression Revenue Regression
Table A2: Cyclicality coefficients - Latin American Countries
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Appendix B
TABLE B1
Relationship between socio-political instability and the cyclicality of government expenditure
OLS Estimates - Dependent variable: Estimated • (Reported in Tables A1 and A2 - left panel)
1 1a 2 2a 3(*) 4 4a 5 5a 6 6a
TRADE* TRADE* TRADE* TRADE* LGDPPC*** TRADE* TRADE* TRADE* TRADE*













LAM 0.44 0.65 0.49 0.24 0.98











No. Obs. 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
Adj. R-squared 0.37 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.53 0.38 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.39
Values reported in parentheses are White heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics.
Asterisks indicates significance levels: ***1%, **5%, *10%.




Relationship between quality and age of democracies and the cyclicality of government expenditure
OLS Estimates - Dependent variable: Estimated • (Reported in Tables A1 and A2 - left panel)
1 1a 2 2a 3 4 4a 5 5a
TRADE* TRADE TRADE* TRADE TRADE* TRADE TRADE** TRADE*
POP65*** POP65 POP65*** POP65* POP65* POP65*** POP65** POP65*** POP65***
AGE -0.08 -0.25 -0.69
(-0.20) (-0.54) (-1.53)






LAM 0.39 0.86 0.88 -1.39









No. Obs. 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 34 34
Adj. R-squared 0.37 0.41 0.38 0.39 0.41 0.38 0.40 0.47 0.45
Values reported in parentheses are White heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics.




Relationship between electoral rules and forms of government and the cyclicality of government expenditure
OLS Estimates - Dependent variable: Estimated • (Reported in Tables A1 and A2 - left panel)
1 2 2a 3 3a 4 5 6 7 8
POP65*** POP65*** POP65*** POP65*** POP65*** POP65*** POP65*** POP65*** POP65** POP65**
INFLATION* INFLATION* INFLATION* INFLATION*
MAJ -0.20 -0.38* -0.20 0.06 -0.46
(-0.93) (-1.73) (-0.92) (0.10) (-1.12)
PRES 0.02 0.11 0.06 -1.01** 0.20



















LAM 0.12 0.85*** 0.86** 0.69
(0.29) (3.54) (2.24) (1.54)
No. Obs. 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
Adj. R-squared 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.43 0.46 0.46 0.43 0.45 0.45 0.43
Values reported in parentheses are White heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics.




Relationship between income inequality and social polarization and the cyclicality of government expenditure
OLS Estimates - Dependent variable: Estimated • (Reported in Tables A1 and A2 - left panel)
1 1a 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
TRADE** TRADE TRADE** TRADE** TRADE* TRADE** TRADE*** TRADE* TRADE** TRADE** POP65* POP65*
INFLATION* INFLATION INFLATION INFLATION* INFLATION INFLATION
AGE -3.37 -4.92** -6.01***
(-1.48) (-2.45) (-3.30)
GASTIL 0.67 0.94 0.93
(0.88) (1.16) (1.14)
AGINIHI 0.07*** 0.04** 0.15*** 0.12*** -0.002
(4.31) (2.49) (3.02) (2.99) (-0.02)
AGINIHI80 0.07*** 0.18*** 0.14*** -0.03
(3.84) (4.32) (2.88) (-0.25)
AGINI80 0.07*** 0.21*** 0.14*** -0.02

























No. Obs. 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 34 34 34
Adj. R-squared 0.40 0.40 0.38 0.39 0.44 0.43 0.47 0.42 0.40 0.42 0.38 0.42 0.42
Values reported in parentheses are White heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics.




Relationship between the type of political regime and the cyclicality of government expenditure
OLS Estimates - Dependent variable: Estimated • (Reported in Tables A1 and A2 - left panel)
1 1a 2 2a 3 3a
TRADE** TRADE* TRADE LGDPPC*** LGDPPC**
POP65*** POP65*** POP65
REGIME -0.76 -0.42 -22.50 -18.82 -8.09 -7.37











LAM 3.15 0.99* 0.87**
(0.87) (1.97) (2.28)
No. Obs. 38 38 38 38 38 38
Adj. R-squared 0.39 0.43 0.37 0.44 0.43 0.47
Values reported in parentheses are White heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics.




Relationship between the IMF programmes and the cyclicality of government expenditure
OLS Estimates - Dependent variable: Estimated • (Reported in Tables A1 and A2 - left panel)
1 1a 1b 2 2a 3 3a 4 4a 5 5a
TRADE* TRADE TRADE TRADE** TRADE TRADE** TRADE POP65*** POP65*** POP65** POP65***
POP65*** POP65* POP65 POP65*** POP65* POP65*** POP65*
IMFINT -0.20 -0.63 0.08 1.84 1.22 1.02 0.46 -1.33 -0.53 -1.58** -0.89

















LAM 0.81 1.38** 0.75 0.78 0.65* 1.01**
(1.64) (2.57) (1.47) (1.57) (1.85) (2.45)
IMFINT*LAM -1.35
(-1.13)
No. Obs. 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 34 34 34 34
Adj. R-squared 0.38 0.42 0.42 0.37 0.41 0.36 0.40 0.45 0.44 0.46 0.43
Values reported in parentheses are White heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics.




Relationship between the degree of development of financial systems and the cyclicality of government expenditure
OLS Estimates - Dependent variable: Estimated • (Reported in Tables A1 and A2 - left panel)
1 1a 1b 2 2a 3 3a 4 4a 5 5a
TRADE* TRADE* TRADE** TRADE* TRADE* TRADE* TRADE* POP65*** POP65*** POP65*** POP65***
POP65*** POP65* POP65 POP65*** POP65* POP65*** POP65*
FINDEPTH 0.004 0.009** 0.009** 0.009 0.019 -0.01 0.002 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.002

















LAM 0.84* 1.03 0.95** 0.87 0.44 0,84***
(1.97) (0.65) (2.08) (1.98) (1.71) (3.26)
FINDEPTH*LAM -0.005
(-0.13)
No. Obs. 33 33 33 32 32 33 33 29 29 29 29
Adj. R-squared 0.38 0.43 0.41 0.32 0.40 0.33 0.39 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.42
Values reported in parentheses are White heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics.




Relationship between government fragmentation and the cyclicality of government expenditure
OLS Estimates - Dependent variable: Estimated • (Reported in Tables A1 and A2 - left panel)










LAM 1.15*** 2.09** 1.13*** 1.53 1.28*** -0.49 1.22*** 1.35









No. Obs. 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
Adj. R-squared 0.39 0.40 0.38 0.36 0.41 0.46 0.37 0.35
Values reported in parentheses are White heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics.





Relationship between socio-political instability and the cyclicality of government revenue
OLS Estimates - Dependent variable: Estimated • (Reported in Tables A1 and A2 - right panel)
1 1a 2 2a 3(*) 4 4a 5 5a 6 6a
POP65* POP65** POP65** POP65* POP65** POP65* POP65** POP65* POP65** POP65*













LAM -0.004 -0.04 0.11 -0.03 0.19











No. Obs. 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
Adj. R-squared 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.03
Values reported in parentheses are White heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics.
Asterisks indicates significance levels: ***1%, **5%, *10%.




Relationship between quality and age of democracies and the cyclicality of government revenue
OLS Estimates - Dependent variable: Estimated • (Reported in Tables A1 and A2 - right panel)
1 1a 2 2a 3 4 4a 5 5a
POP65** POP65* INFLATION* POP65* POP65 POP65* POP65
INFLATION* INFLATION INFLATION* INFLATION
AGE -0.03 -0.21 0.44
(-0.07) (-0.35) (0.49)






LAM -0.15 0.99* 1.53 -0.28 0.90









No. Obs. 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 34 34
Adj. R-squared 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.10 0.05
Values reported in parentheses are White heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics.




Relationship between electoral rules and forms of government and the cyclicality of government revenue
OLS Estimates - Dependent variable: Estimated • (Reported in Tables A1 and A2 - right panel)
1 2 2a 3 3a 4 5 6 7 8
POP65* POP65** POP65* POP65** POP65** POP65* POP65** INFLATION**
INFLATION* INFLATION* INFLATION*
MAJ 0.16 0.07 0.13 -0.13 0.19
(0.56) (0.21) (0.49) (-0.27) (0.36)
PRES 0.44* 0.60 0.42* -0.43 1.20**





















No. Obs. 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
Adj. R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.14 0.04 0.04 0.12 0.08
Values reported in parentheses are White heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics.




Relationship between income inequality and social polarization and the cyclicality of government revenue
OLS Estimates - Dependent variable: Estimated • (Reported in Tables A1 and A2 - right panel)
1 1a 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
INFLATION* INFLATION INFLATION* INFLATION INFLATION INFLATION* INFLATION* INFLATION* INFLATION**
AGE -2.92** -3.55** -3.32*
(-2.17) (-2.51) (-1.99)
GASTIL 0.94** 1.01** 0.88*
(2.43) (2.34) (1.96)
AGINIHI 0.03** 0.04 0.09*** 0.08** 0.14**
(2.72) (1.23) (3.51) (2.68) (2.02)
AGINIHI80 0.02** 0.10*** 0.08** 0.03
(2.06) (3.13) (2.26) (0.51)
AGINI80 0.02* 0.10** 0.07* 0.02

























No. Obs. 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 34 34 34
Adj. R-squared 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.13 0.04 0.03
Values reported in parentheses are White heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics.




Relationship between the type of political regime and the cyclicality of government revenue
OLS Estimates - Dependent variable: Estimated • (Reported in Tables A1 and A2 - right panel)
1 1a 2 2a 3 3a
POP65* POP65 POP65 POP65
REGIME -0.66 0.32 -1.62 -1.30 0.22 -0.61











LAM 0.09 1.15 0.09 0.41
(0.31) (0.83) (0.30) (1.36)
No. Obs. 38 38 38 38 38 38
Adj. R-squared 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.01 -0.02 -0.004
Values reported in parentheses are White heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics.




Relationship between the IMF programmes and the cyclicality of government revenue
OLS Estimates - Dependent variable: Estimated • (Reported in Tables A1 and A2 - right panel)
1 1a 1b 2 2a 3 3a 4 4a 5 5a
POP65* POP65* POP65 INFLATION** INFLATION*
INFLATION* INFLATION* INFLATION*
IMFINT -0.05 -0.05 0.78 0.56 -0.08 1.67 1.32 -2.69** -1.78 -1.09 -0.54

















LAM -0.002 0.63 0.37 0.23 0.64 0.60
(-0.01) (1.04) (1.03) (0.69) (1.52) (1.16)
IMFINT*LAM -1.50
(-1.34)
No. Obs. 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 34 34 34 34
Adj. R-squared 0.07 0.05 0.07 -0.05 -0.04 0.03 0.01 0.06 -0.001 0.04 0.02
Values reported in parentheses are White heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics.




Relationship between the degree of development of financial systems and the cyclicality of government revenue
OLS Estimates - Dependent variable: Estimated • (Reported in Tables A1 and A2 - right panel)
1 1a 1b 2 2a 3 3a 4 4a 5 5a
FINDEPTH -0.006* -0.003 -0.002 -0.03*** -0.03** -0.02 -0.01 -0.0002 -0.007 -0.003 -0.004

















LAM 0.26 0.66 0.12 0.24 0.61 0.24
(0.96) (0.77) (0.40) (0.75) (1.61) (0.24)
FINDEPTH*LAM -0.01
(-0.48)
No. Obs. 33 33 33 32 32 33 33 29 29 29 29
Adj. R-squared 0.03 0.02 -0.007 0.11 0.08 -0.03 -0.05 0.07 0.004 -0.03 0.001
Values reported in parentheses are White heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics.




Relationship between government fragmentation and the cyclicality of government revenue
OLS Estimates - Dependent variable: Estimated • (Reported in Tables A1 and A2 - right panel)










LAM 0.30 1.28** 0.26 1.19 0.41* -0.42 -0.09 -0.29









No. Obs. 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
Adj. R-squared 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.03
Values reported in parentheses are White heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics.
Asterisks indicates significance levels: ***1%, **5%, *10%.
Control variables
SpecificationsData Appendix
AGE – Index of the age of a democracy, defined as AGE = (2003-DEMAGE) / 203 and varying between 
0 and 1, with the United States being the oldest democracy (value of 1). Source: See DEMAGE.
AGINIHI – Average of all “high quality” available Gini coefficients between 1960 and 1996. By high 
quality, we mean those values marked as “accept” in the quality evaluation in the database. The 
coefficients range between 0 and 100, with higher values meaning more inequality in income distribution. 
Source: Deininger, K. and Squire, L. (1996).
AGINIHI80 – Average of all high quality available Gini coefficients during the 1980s. By high quality, 
we mean those values marked as “accept” in the quality evaluation in the database. The coefficients range 
between 0 and 100, with higher values meaning more inequality in income distribution. Source: 
Deininger, K. and Squire, L. (1996).
AGINI80 - Average of all available Gini coefficients during the 1980s, regardless of their quality. The 
coefficient ranges between 0 and 100, with higher values meaning more inequality in income distribution. 
Source: Deininger, K. and Squire, L. (1996).
AUTOC  – Indicator of institutionalized autocracy, ranging from 0 to 10. Higher values mean more 
autocratic institutions.
Source: POLITY IV Project. http://cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm
CABCHG – Number of cabinet changes. The number of times in a year that a new premier is named 
and/or 50% of the cabinet posts are occupied by new ministers. Source: CNTS Database.
CABSIZE  – Size of cabinet. Refers to the number of ministers of “cabinet rank”, excluding 
undersecretaries, parliamentary secretaries, ministerial alternates, etc. Includes the president and vice-
president under a presidential system, but not under a parliamentary system. Heads of state are excluded, 
except under a presidential system.
Source: CNTS Database.
COAL  – Party coalition. 0 = no coalition and no opposition; 1 = more than one party, coalition 
government and no opposition; 2 = more than one party, coalition government and opposition; 3 = 
minority government. Source: CNTS Database.
CONSTCHG – Number of major constitutional changes. The number of basic alterations in a state’s 
constitutional structure in a year, the extreme case being the adoption of a new constitution that 
significantly alters the prerogatives of the various branches of government. Examples of the latter might 
be the substitution of a presidential regime by parliamentary government or the replacement of monarchic 
by republican rule. Constitutional amendments which do not have any significant impact on the political 
system are not counted. Source: CNTS Database.
COUPS  – Number of coups d’état. The number of extra-constitutional or forced changes in the top 
government elite and/or its effective control of the nation’s power structure in a given year. The term 
“coup” includes, but is not exhausted by, the term “successful revolution”. Unsuccessful coups are not 
counted. Source: CNTS Database.
DEFLATOR – GDP Deflator. Index number with 2000=100. Source: IMF-IFS CD ROM 2004.
DEMAGE – First year of democratic rule in a country, corresponding to the first year of a string of 
positive yearly values of the variable POLITY for that country continuing uninterruptedly until 2003 (the 
end of the sample), given that the country was also an independent nation during the entire time period. 
Does not consider foreign occupation during World War II as an interruption of democracy. Source: 
POLITY IV Project. http://cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm
DEMOC – Measures the general openness of political institutions. It is an institutionalized democracy 
index, derived from codings of the competitiveness of political participation, the regulation of 38
participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief 
executive. It ranges between 0 and 10, with higher values meaning more democratic institutions.
Source: POLITY IV Project. http://cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm
EXECHG – Changes in the Effective Executive. The number of times in a year that effective control of 
the executive power changes hands. Such a change requires that the new executive be independent of its
predecessor. Source: CNTS Database.
EXP – Nominal total central government expenditure, in units of the national currency, except in the case 
of Ecuador (US$). Source: IMF-IFS CD ROM 2004. 
FINDEPTH – Indicator of financial depth as a proxy for the degree of development of the financial 
system. Defined as liquid liabilities (M3) as a percentage of GDP. Source: World Bank. WDI 2004.
GASTIL – Average of indexes for civil liberties and political rights, where each index is measured on a 1-
to-7 scale with 1 representing the highest degree of freedom and 7 the lowest. Countries whose combined 
averages for political rights and civil liberties fall between 1.0 and 2.5 are designated “free”, those whose 
averages fall between 3.0 and 5.5 are designated “partly free”, and those whose averages fall between 5.5 
and 7.0 are designated “not free”.
Source: Freedom House, “Annual Survey of Freedom Country Ratings”. http://freedomhouse.org
GDP – GDP at current prices, in units of the national currency except in the case of Ecuador (in US$). 
Source: IMF-IFS CD ROM 2004.
GDPPC – GDP per capita (Parity Purchasing Power) in constant 2000 international $. Source: World 
Bank. WDI 2004.
GOVTCRIS – Number of government crises in a year. A government crisis means anyrapidlydeveloping 
situation that threatens to bring about the downfall of the present regime – excluding situations of revolt 
aimed at such overthrow. Source: CNTS Database.
HPTRENDS – Hodrick-Prescott trend values of REALGDP, obtained using the MS-Excel routine for HP 
Filter, with  100 = l .
IMFINT – Dummy variable, assuming the value 1 if a country was under an IMF adjustment programme, 
0 otherwise. Our sources were the IMF Annual Reports. We checked all existing programmes since 1960, 
independently of their degree of conditionality. The interventions that were checked included Stand-By 
Arrangements, Extended Fund Facility, Structural Adjustment Facility, Enhanced Structural Adjustment 
Facility and Poverty Reduction Growth Facility. Should there be any intervention of the Fund in a 
country, in a given calendar year, the value 1 was considered for this variable, even if the intervention 
began close to the end of the year. This is important because the IMF considers fiscal years as ending on 
April 30th in its Annual Reports, so that the values of this variable could be different if we had considered 
a year starting on May 1st.
Source: IMF annual reports.
INFLATION – Rate of variation of the consumer price index. Source: World Bank. WDI 2004.
LAM  - Regional dummy variable, equal to 1 if the country belongs to Latin America, 0 otherwise. 
Although Mexico belongs to the OECD, we considered it as a Latin American country.
LEGSIZE – Size of Legislature (Lower House). Source: CNTS Database.
LRGDP – Natural logarithm of REALGDP. Source: See REALGDP.
LGDPPC – Natural logarithm of GDPPC. Source: See GDPPC.
LHPTRENDS – Natural logarithm of HPTRENDS. Source: See HPTRENDS.39
MAJ – Dummy variable for electoral systems, equal to 1 if all of the members of the lower house in a 
country are elected under plurality rule, 0 otherwise. Only legislative elections (to the lower house) are 
considered. Source: Person and Tabellini (2003) database.
http://www.igier.uni-bocconi.it/whos.php?vedi=327&tbn=albero&id_doc=177.




2 1 , where 
i t is the proportion of 
members associated with the  th i party in the lower house of the legislature. Source: CNTS Database.
The index is defined as the probability that two randomly chosen legislators belong to different parties, 
and ranges between 0 and 1. The higher the index, the larger the number of parties in the legislature.
POLCONIII – Index of political constraints. It captures the feasibility of policy change (the extent to 
which a change in the preferences of any one actor may lead to a change in government policy), or the 
extent to which the executives face political constraints in implementing their policy. It ranges between 0 
and 1. Source: Henisz, W. (2002), The Institutional Environment for Infrastructure Investment, Industrial 
and Corporate Change, 11(2).
POLITY – Score for democracy, computed by subtracting the AUTOC score from the DEMOC score and 
ranging from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). Sources: See AUTOC and DEMOC.
POP65 – Population aged 65 and above as a percentage of the total population. Source: World Bank. 
WDI 2004.
PRES  – Dummy variable for forms of government, equal to 1 in presidential regimes, 0 otherwise. 
Source: Person and Tabellini (2003) database. 
http://www.igier.uni-bocconi.it/whos.php?vedi=327&tbn=albero&id_doc=177
REALEXP  – Real total central government expenditure, obtained  by  computing 
(EXP/DEFLATOR)*100.
REALGDP  – GDP at constant 2000 local currency prices, obtained by  computing 
(GDP/DEFLATOR)*100.
REALREVE - Real total central government revenue, obtained by computing (REVE/DEFLATOR)*100.
REGIME – Type of regime. 1 – Civilian. 2 – Military-civilian. 3 – Military. Source: CNTS Database.
REVE - Nominal total central government revenue, in units of the national currency except in the case of 
Ecuador (US$). Source: IMF-IFS CD ROM 2004. 
REVOLS – Number of revolutions in a given year. Any illegal or forced change in the top governmental 
elite, any attempt at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is 
independence from the central government. Source: CNTS Database.
SEAT – Inverse of share in percentage terms of the major party in the legislature, computed as LEGSIZE 
/ SELP. Higher SEAT values represent a weaker position of the largest party in the legislature. Sources: 
See LEGSIZE and SELP.
SELP – Number of seats held by the largest party in the legislature. Source: CNTS Database.
SOCPOL1 – Composite index of social polarization. It interacts social polarization with institutional 
quality. The variable is defined as AGINIHI * (1-POLCONIII). Sources: See AGINIHI and POLCONIII.
SOCPOL2 – Composite index of social polarization. It interacts social polarization with institutional 
quality. The variable is defined as AGINIHI80 * (1-POLCONIII). Sources: See AGINIHI80 and 
POLCONIII.40
SOCPOL3 – Composite index of social polarization. It interacts social polarization with institutional 
quality. The variable is defined as AGINI80 * (1-POLCONIII). Sources: See AGINI80 and POLCONIII.
TRADE – Total trade as a percentage of current GDP. Total trade includes the exports and imports of 
goods and services in current US$. Source: World Bank. WDI 2004.41
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